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Abstract: Can the phenomena of associative learning be replaced
wholesale by a propositional reasoning system? Mitchell et al. make a
strong case against an automatic, unconscious, and encapsulated
associative system. However, their propositional account fails to
distinguish inferences based on actions from those based on
observation. Causal Bayes networks remedy this shortcoming, and also
provide an overarching framework for both learning and reasoning. On
this account, causal representations are primary, but associative
learning processes are not excluded a priori.
The task of providing a unified framework for learning is fraught
with difficulties. It must cover a wide diversity of empirical find-
ings, mesh with theories of memory, attention, and reasoning,
and be plausible from both a neural and evolutionary perspec-
tive. And all this should be achieved with a minimum of postu-
lates and parameters. It is little wonder that numerous
contenders have fallen by the wayside.
Mitchell et al. launch a bold challenge to associative theories of
learning. They argue that the phenomena of associative learning
can be explained in terms of a propositional reasoning system,
and that there is scant evidence or need for a separate link-for-
mation system. Their thesis has many positives. One is the
attempt to integrate both learning and reasoning in a unified
system. This is a good thing – for too long these have been
studied in relative isolation from one another, separated by
different concepts, paradigms, and terminologies. This division
ignores the rich interplay between learning and reasoning, and
the possibility that a common framework subserves both.
Another positive is the rejection of associative link-formation as
automatic, unconscious, and encapsulated from higher-level cog-
nition. There is extensive evidence against this view (De Houwer
2009; Lovibond & Shanks 2002), and it unnecessarily cuts associ-
ative theories off from other reasoning processes.
Despite these positives, there are several problems with
Mitchell et al.’s account, in particular their desire to replace
associative theories wholesale with propositional reasoning.
First, Mitchell et al. give few details about this propositional
reasoning system, but the details matter a great deal. For
example, none of the current models of human reasoning,
whether mental models, logic, or probability-based theories,
can handle causal inference (Glymour 2007; Sloman &
Lagnado 2005). This is because the current models lack the
formal machinery to distinguish inferences based on actions
from those based on observation. This is crucial if a
representational system is to provide a guide for predicting the
effects of potential actions.
Causal Bayes networks (CBN) formalize the distinction
between intervention and observation (Pearl 2000; Spirtes et al.
1993), and provide an overarching normative framework for
both reasoning and learning. A directed link from X to Y rep-
resents a causal relation, such that potential manipulations of X
can lead to changes in Y. This contrasts with associative, probabil-
istic, or logical connections between X and Y, which cannot
capture the causal direction.
Formalizing the distinction is also critical to causal learning.
Associative or probabilistic information by itself is insufficient
to distinguish between causal models (e.g., an association
between bell and food can be generated by various causal struc-
tures, including a model where the experimenter is the common
cause of both). Interventions allow the learner to discriminate
between covariationally equivalent models and to identify a
unique causal structure (e.g., if interventions on the bell do not
produce food [nor vice versa], but interventions on the exper-
imenter produce both bell ringing and food, then the exper-
imenter is the common cause of both).
A recent wave of psychological research suggests that people
conform to the basic prescripts of CBN (Gopnik et al. 2004;
Lagnado & Sloman 2004; Sloman & Lagnado 2005; Steyvers
et al. 2003, Waldmann & Hagmayer 2005), and work is
ongoing to identify the psychological processes that underpin
this behavior. Although the accent is on causal representation,
the involvement of associative mechanisms is not thereby
excluded (e.g., they might be used to parameterize strengths of
hypothesized causal links; Griffiths & Tenenbaum 2005). More-
over, sometimes associative connections are the most that can
be established, and suffice as crude guides to prediction (e.g.,
when interventions are impractical, or at the early stages of
inquiry).
Nevertheless, in such contexts associative mechanisms will be
unlike the traditional conception that Mitchell et al. rightly criti-
cize. Thus, contingency information is not processed automati-
cally, irrespective of prior beliefs, instructions, or other
information. Rather, various sources of evidence are integrated
to infer causal structure, including covariation, interventions,
temporal order, and prior knowledge (Lagnado et al. 2007). Con-
tingency information is not privileged here; in fact, the interpret-
ation of contingency data will be modulated by other information
such as temporal order (Burns & McCormack, under review;
Lagnado & Sloman 2004; 2006).
A further problem is that Mitchell et al., along with many
learning theorists, assume that propositional and link-formation
systems offer competing accounts of human learning. However,
these systems need not be incompatible, as each system has dis-
tinct representational aims. Thus, a propositional causal model
aims to represent how things relate in the external world,
whereas an associative link models the reasoning process itself
(Pearl & Russell 2001). For instance, the bell! food link (see
Fig. 1 in the target article) represents the inference from bell
to food, but not how these variables relate in the world (a plaus-
ible causal model is: bell experimenter! food). These two
approaches are not exclusive; it is conceivable that people have
causal representations of the world but use associative-like pro-
cesses for prediction and parameter learning. Mitchell et al.
risk setting up a false dichotomy – either propositions or links –
without acknowledging that these concepts serve different
representational aims.
Another concern is Mitchell et al.’s argument from parsimony.
They maintain that a dual system with two components can never
be simpler than a single system made up from just one of these
components. But this moves too fast, and depends heavily on
how simplicity is quantified. Extending a propositional reasoning
system to accommodate all learning phenomena might introduce
additional complexity, such that a dual system turns out simpler
overall. Despite this lacuna, the evidence that Mitchell et al. cite
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against a dual-system approach is strong. Rather than reject
associative mechanisms tout court, however, a third way
remains open. Why not endorse a unified framework that takes
the interaction between learning and reasoning seriously, but
allows for variation in the complexity of representations and
inferential processes? For example, modes of representation
might range from causal models to associative networks, and
computation might range from fully Bayesian to heuristic
methods. These variations will be determined by task demands,
as well as environmental and cognitive constraints (e.g., infor-
mation availability; memory, and processing limitations).
The key point is that a unified framework does not require that
the same representations and computations are used for every
learning problem; multiple processes are available, and are
selected or integrated as required. In short, the flexibility of
our cognition system is likely to permit various representational
and inferential solutions, including both propositional and associ-
ative processes.
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